Drop only the field when compressed DATA cannot be decoded

.agents/sow/SOW-status.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # SOW Status
 
-Last updated: 2026-11-08
+Last updated: 2026-11-09
 
 ## Backlog Order
 
@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ order; the user may reorder it.
 
 ## Recently Closed Or Completed
 
+- SOW-0178 - Undecompressible DATA Costs One Field, Not The Entry: completed
+  2026-11-09 (decisions 1B, xz = B).
 - SOW-0176 - Single Ownership Follow-ups: completed 2026-11-08; follow-up
   SOW-0177.
 - SOW-0174 - Rust Registry Unwatch Leaves Files When The Directory Key

.agents/sow/done/SOW-0178-20261109-undecompressible-data-costs-one-field.md

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+# SOW-0178 - Undecompressible DATA Costs One Field, Not The Entry
+
+## Status
+
+Status: completed
+
+`completed` is the successful terminal status. `done` is a directory name, not a status value. Do not use `Status: done` or `Status: complete`.
+
+Sub-state: completed 2026-11-09 (user decisions 1B and xz = B). Branch `sow-0178/undecompressible-data-field`,
+stacked on SOW-0176.
+
+## Requirements
+
+### Purpose
+
+A damaged compressed DATA object should cost the field it holds, as it does in
+systemd, instead of failing the whole entry.
+
+### User Request
+
+SOW-0176 PR review, decision 1: "B: skip the field, as systemd does", as its
+own SOW so the reader-hardening contract change is reviewed separately.
+
+### Assistant Understanding
+
+Facts:
+
+- systemd skips an entry item whose payload read returns `-EADDRNOTAVAIL` or
+  `-EBADMSG` (systemd/systemd @ c0a5a2516d28601fb3afc1a77d7b42fcfe38fced
+  `src/libsystemd/sd-journal/sd-journal.c:2852,2896`). Corrupt zstd and lz4
+  streams return `-EBADMSG` (`src/basic/compress.c` lz4 and
+  `zstd_ret_to_errno`). Corrupt xz returns `-ENOMEM`
+  (`decompress_blob_xz`), which is not skipped.
+- Stock v262 differential (`.local/sow0178/codec_diff.py`, 5-entry files whose
+  one compressed DATA object is shared by every entry):
+  - zstd corrupt (bit flip, zeroed tail): stock rc 0, 5 rows, field dropped
+    (75 to 70 fields). Go and Rust: rc 1, no rows.
+  - lz4 bad stored size (+1, -1): stock rc 0, 5 rows, field dropped. Go and
+    Rust: rc 1, no rows.
+  - xz corrupt: stock rc 1, `Failed to read journal: Cannot allocate memory`,
+    no rows. Go and Rust: rc 1, no rows.
+  - Reader-hardening zstd fixtures (bad later checksum, truncated later frame,
+    trailing garbage, oversized 768 MiB + 1): stock keeps all 4 rows and drops
+    only the damaged MESSAGE field.
+- Unique-value enumeration returns decompression errors in systemd
+  (`sd-journal.c` `sd_journal_enumerate_unique`), so it is out of scope.
+- SDK sites: Go `recoverableEntryDataError` (`go/journal/reader_entry.go`) and
+  `decompressDataPayload` (`go/journal/verify_graph.go:1166`); Rust
+  `recoverable_entry_data_error` (`rust/src/journal/src/reader_helpers.rs:245`)
+  and `JournalError::DecompressorError`.
+- `tests/interoperability/run_reader_hardening.py` streams cases expect an
+  entry error for the corrupt and oversized cases.
+
+Unknowns:
+
+- None beyond the open decision.
+
+### Acceptance Criteria
+
+- In both languages, current-entry reads (`GetEntry`/`get_entry`, payload
+  visitors, entry enumeration, facade data getters, Netdata row expansion)
+  drop a field whose compressed DATA fails to decompress, per the decision.
+- Strict verification still fails such files.
+- The hardening streams cases expect stock's rows, and the codec differential
+  matches stock exit status and row and field counts.
+
+## Analysis
+
+See Facts. The change is a classification of decompression errors in one
+predicate per language, plus the consequences in the hardening matrix, tests
+and docs (`docs/Reader-APIs.md`, `docs/Rust-API.md`, `product-scope.md`).
+
+## Pre-Implementation Gate
+
+Status: ready
+
+Problem / root-cause model:
+
+- Decompression errors are not in the recoverable set in either language.
+
+Evidence reviewed:
+
+- See Facts.
+
+Affected contracts and surfaces:
+
+- Go and Rust reader current-entry APIs, facades, Netdata row expansion, both
+  journalctl rewrites through them.
+
+Existing patterns to reuse:
+
+- The SOW-0176 recoverable-error predicates and damage tests.
+
+Risk and blast radius:
+
+- A row can silently lose a field; the field-level drop is what systemd and the
+  Netdata plugin already show. Verification stays strict.
+
+Sensitive data handling plan:
+
+- Synthetic fixtures only.
+
+Implementation plan:
+
+1. Classify decompression failures per the decision in both languages.
+2. Paired damage tests per codec; update hardening expectations; docs and spec.
+
+Validation plan:
+
+- Unit tests, `run_reader_hardening.py`, `codec_diff.py`, query and verify
+  matrices.
+
+Artifact impact plan:
+
+- AGENTS.md: none expected.
+- Runtime project skills: none expected.
+- Specs: `product-scope.md` recovery text.
+- End-user/operator docs: `docs/Reader-APIs.md`, `docs/Rust-API.md`.
+- End-user/operator skills: none.
+- SOW lifecycle: pending until the decision.
+
+Open-source reference evidence:
+
+- Cited in Facts.
+
+Open decisions:
+
+- None; xz decided 2026-11-09 (B).
+
+## Implications And Decisions
+
+- 2026-11-09, decision 1B (SOW-0176 review): skip the field, as systemd does.
+- 2026-11-09, xz = B (user): systemd fails the whole read on corrupt xz
+  (`-ENOMEM`) while skipping corrupt zstd and lz4; the SDK skips the field for
+  every codec. The xz difference is recorded in docs, spec and code comments.
+
+## Plan
+
+See the implementation plan above.
+
+## Implementation And Review Plan
+
+Implementation:
+
+- The project manager implements both languages in one chunk with tests.
+
+Reviewers:
+
+- Whole-SOW self-review after local validation; tests are the gate. External
+  reviewers are not used.
+
+Repository boundary block for every external-agent prompt:
+
+```text
+CRITICAL REPOSITORY BOUNDARY:
+- Do not make changes outside this repository for any reason.
+- Repository path: current repository root.
+- You may inspect external references read-only when the task requires it.
+- Write, edit, delete, move, reset, checkout, install, generate, cache, or format nothing outside this repository.
+- The only write exception outside the repository is /tmp.
+- Prefer .local/ inside this repository for scratch work, generated temporary files, cloned references, logs, and working notes.
+```
+
+## Execution Log
+
+### 2026-11-09
+
+- Created with the stock differential above.
+- Implemented: Go wraps every decompression failure in `errDataDecompression`
+  (`decompressDataPayload`), which `recoverableEntryDataError` accepts. Rust
+  moves the predicate to `JournalError::is_recoverable_entry_data` in
+  `journal-core` (one owner for the SDK and `journal-engine`) and adds
+  `DecompressorError`. Explorer facet classification (Go
+  `classifyDataForAccumulator`, Rust `classify_data_for_accumulator`) and the
+  Rust `journal-engine` row projection skip the field too. Go Netdata rows go
+  through `GetEntry`/`CollectEntryPayloads`, already covered.
+- `TestNativeFilterDoesNotDecodeUnrelatedCompressedData` proved a payload read
+  decodes the damaged DATA by expecting `GetEntry` to fail; it now checks that
+  MESSAGE is dropped, which proves the same thing.
+- Duplication gate: the new Rust `impl` first lengthened a baselined block shared
+  with the legacy `jf` copy; placing it at the end of `error.rs` fixed it.
+
+## Validation
+
+Acceptance criteria evidence:
+
+- Current-entry reads, visitors, enumeration, facade getters, Explorer facets
+  and Rust row projection drop the damaged field: paired tests
+  `TestDamagedCompressedDataCostsTheFieldNotTheEntry` /
+  `damaged_compressed_data_costs_the_field` (zstd, xz, lz4) and
+  `TestExplorerSkipsDamagedCompressedData` /
+  `explorer_skips_damaged_compressed_data`. Both explorer tests fail with the
+  explorer change disabled.
+- Strict verification still fails: asserted in the same tests and in the
+  hardening matrix (`verify` probe and stock verify).
+- Stock parity (`.local/sow0178/codec_diff.py`): zstd bit flip and zeroed tail,
+  lz4 stored size +1 and -1: stock, Go and Rust all rc 0, 5 rows, 70 of 75
+  fields. xz: Go and Rust rc 0, 5 rows, 70 fields; stock rc 1 (decided
+  difference).
+
+Tests or equivalent validation (2026-11-09, stock = systemd 262 oracle):
+
+- `go test ./journal ./cmd/...` PASS; `cargo test --workspace` PASS;
+  `cargo fmt --check` clean; no new clippy warnings in changed code.
+- `run_reader_hardening.py` (both adapters, v262 `--journalctl`, new `.local`
+  `--out`, all groups): PASS, 552 observations; the streams cases now expect
+  stock's rows and check them against stock `-o export`.
+- `run_compression_matrix.py` 24/24, `run_verify_matrix.py` PASS,
+  `run_mixed_directory_matrix.py` 42/42, `run_live_matrix.py` 18/18,
+  `verify_examples.py` and `check_wiki_docs.py` PASS, `check_duplication.py`
+  PASS.
+- `run_journalctl_query_matrix.py` with follow: first run had one failure,
+  `follow-grep-boot-events` with the stock reader ("go live fixture writer did
+  not become ready", fixture start-up timing); the rerun passed with 0 failures.
+
+Real-use evidence:
+
+- Both built CLIs against stock v262 on the corrupted codec files above.
+
+Reviewer findings:
+
+- Project-manager review of the whole change; no external reviewers. Unique
+  enumeration (`EnumerateUniquePayload`, `enumerate_unique_payload`, Explorer
+  indexed values) still returns the error, as systemd's
+  `sd_journal_enumerate_unique` does. `UnknownCompressionMethod` stays an
+  error (systemd: `-EPROTONOSUPPORT`, not skipped by `enumerate_data`).
+
+Same-failure scan:
+
+- Every caller of `decompressDataPayload` and `.decompress(` was checked:
+  writer dedup and verification keep failing (the wrapped error still fails
+  them); unique and boot-listing paths keep the error by design.
+
+Sensitive data gate:
+
+- Synthetic fixtures and public systemd references only.
+
+Artifact maintenance gate:
+
+- AGENTS.md: no change.
+- Runtime project skills: no change; the hardening recipe is unchanged.
+- Specs: `product-scope.md` (field-level DATA damage).
+- End-user/operator docs: `docs/Reader-APIs.md`.
+- End-user/operator skills: none exist.
+- SOW lifecycle: `Status: completed`, moved to `done/`.
+- SOW-status.md: updated.
+
+Specs update:
+
+- `product-scope.md`.
+
+Project skills update:
+
+- None needed.
+
+End-user/operator docs update:
+
+- `docs/Reader-APIs.md`.
+
+End-user/operator skills update:
+
+- None exist.
+
+Lessons:
+
+- See `## Lessons Extracted`.
+
+Follow-up mapping:
+
+- None.
+
+## Outcome
+
+A damaged compressed DATA object now costs one field in both SDKs and CLIs,
+matching stock v262 for zstd and lz4; xz deliberately drops the field where
+stock fails the read.
+
+## Lessons Extracted
+
+- "As systemd does" must be checked per code path: systemd's own errno choice
+  (xz `-ENOMEM`) decided its behavior, not the kind of damage.
+
+## Followup
+
+None.
+
+## Regression Log
+
+None.

.agents/sow/specs/product-scope.md

@@ -804,6 +804,13 @@ Rust applies this policy in JournalReader without changing the public
 JournalCursor layout; the low-level cursor handles positioning and initial
 error recovery, not automatic EOF refresh.
 
+A damaged DATA object behind one entry item (bad offset, type or size, or a
+compressed payload that cannot be decoded) costs that field in current-entry
+reads, Explorer and Netdata facets and journalctl output, in both languages.
+This matches systemd for zstd and lz4; systemd fails the whole read on corrupt
+xz (`-ENOMEM`), an accepted difference (SOW-0178). Unique enumeration and strict
+verification still fail.
+
 Recovery retains native index/header access and does not expand DATA rows to
 establish the prefix. Interior holes followed by readable entries, wrong types,
 cycles, malformed nonzero sizes, decompression failures and general I/O errors

docs/Reader-APIs.md

@@ -108,11 +108,13 @@ Detection is lazy where the native access path permits it. A zero/`None` status
 means no loss has been observed; it does not certify integrity. A catalog query
 does not validate unrelated entry arrays.
 
-A single unreadable DATA object, or one without a field separator, costs that
-field only when reading the current entry: `GetEntry`/`get_entry` still return
-the entry and the payload visitor and enumeration calls continue, and a payload
-without `=` stays in the raw payload list. A DATA object that cannot be decompressed still fails the
-entry.
+A single unreadable DATA object, one that cannot be decompressed, or one without
+a field separator costs that field only when reading the current entry:
+`GetEntry`/`get_entry` still return the entry, the payload visitor and
+enumeration calls continue, Explorer and Netdata facets skip the field, and a
+payload without `=` stays in the raw payload list. Unique-value enumeration and
+`--verify` still report the damage. Corrupt zstd and lz4 data match systemd;
+for corrupt xz data systemd fails the whole read, while the SDK drops the field.
 
 Recovery is read-only: the SDK does not reconstruct or overwrite damaged source
 journals. Journald abandons a corrupt file and writes to a new one. Normal live

go/journal/explorer.go

@@ -2140,11 +2140,17 @@ func (r *Reader) classifyDataForAccumulator(dataOffset uint64, acc *explorerAccu
 	stats.DataCacheMisses++
 	stats.DataPayloadsLoaded++
 	header, err := r.readDataHeaderAt(dataOffset)
-	if err != nil {
-		return offsetClass{}, err
+	var payload []byte
+	if err == nil {
+		payload, err = r.readDataPayloadWithHeader(dataOffset, header)
 	}
-	payload, err := r.readDataPayloadWithHeader(dataOffset, header)
 	if err != nil {
+		// A bad DATA object costs its field, as in the entry readers.
+		if recoverableEntryDataError(err) {
+			class := offsetClass{kind: offsetClassIrrelevant}
+			acc.offsetCache.insert(dataOffset, class)
+			return class, nil
+		}
 		return offsetClass{}, err
 	}
 	if header.object.flag&(objectCompressedXZ|objectCompressedLZ4|objectCompressedZSTD) != 0 {