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feat: carry sealed Oblivious HTTP requests over Nostr relays, off by default - #142
Wallets can now reach the pool's Oblivious HTTP gateway (#127) through public Nostr relays. No relay operator has to agree to forward traffic for us.
Sending: the wallet seals each request exactly as it would for an HTTP relay, puts it in a Nostr event signed by a fresh key, and publishes it to two of six pinned relays.
Answering: the gateway listens on those relays, opens the request through the same code as the HTTP route, and publishes the sealed answer back as events.
What a relay sees: the wallet's IP, but not the request. That is the same trade as an OHTTP relay.
Status: nothing uses this yet; Plan 3 wires up the wallet. The gateway stays off until SHIELDED_OHTTP_KEY is set.
Wire format (packages/protocol/src/nostr-carrier.ts)
Requests use kind 21470 and answers kind 21471. Both are ephemeral, and neither is a registered kind.
A request is one event carrying at most 32 KiB of sealed bytes. An answer is at most 8 chunks of 32 KiB each; the format itself allows 32.
Status events (503 when the gateway is shed, 429 when it is rate-limited, each with a retry delay) tell the wallet a request never ran, so it may send again.
Shared core:open() is shared by the HTTP route and the listener: admission, the replay register, forwarding and sealing.
Nostr key: the gateway's Nostr key is derived from the OHTTP key (HKDF-SHA256 with shielded-nostr-carrier-v1), so there is still one secret. The keygen prints its public key as nostr:.
Listener:
It holds one subscription per relay through ensureRelay, with limit:0 and a since bound.
It drops copies of a request before open(), and answers on every relay that delivered the request.
It sends at most 5 status events a second, and resubscribes itself after 30 s.
It starts once the pool has opened and closes before the pool does. So a rolling deploy never has two listeners running.
HTTP route: with the key set, POST /api/rollup/ohttp is off unless SHIELDED_OHTTP_HTTP=1. GET /api/rollup/ohttp-keys stays.
Default relays:nos.lol, relay.snort.social, offchain.pub, nostr.mom, nostr.oxtr.dev and nostr-pub.wellorder.net.
None sits behind Cloudflare, and none is ours or Arkade's.
All were probed on 2026-11-06 for full-size ephemeral events.
Override the list with SHIELDED_NOSTR_RELAYS.
Client (src/shielded/sealed-fetch.ts, runs in the browser and in Node)
createSealedFetch is a drop-in fetch. It keeps only the content-type and accept headers, and never falls back to a direct request.
GETs are sealed again and retried up to 3 times, through relays not yet tried.
POSTs are sealed once, and every retry re-sends the same bytes. The gateway's replay register therefore makes a POST run at most once, whatever relays claim.
Unanswered POSTs: a POST that reached any relay and got no answer ends outcome-unknown, never unavailable.
nostr-tools 2.24.1 traps found and avoided
Memory leak:subscribeMany keeps every event id it sees, as a V8 sliced string that pins the whole relay message (about 40 KB per 40 KB event).
The listener subscribes per relay instead.
After the fix it retains 869 B per event, bounded at about 3.7 MiB.
Deaf listener:enableReconnect resubscribes with since=lastEmitted+1, so one future-dated event deafens the listener. It is off, and the listener resubscribes itself.
Dropped connections:enablePing closed healthy connections at about 49 s. It is off.
Publish results:publish fulfils with connection failure: … for an unreachable relay, and passes on the relay's raw OK value, which may be absent or an object. The client classifies results defensively.
Stored events: strfry stores ephemeral events for 300 s and serves them to new subscriptions. Without limit:0 and since, a restarted gateway would run answered requests again.
Before turning it on in production
docs/DOKPLOY.md lists these:
Plan 2c:
Front-running fix: address answers by sha256(enc). Today a reader can copy a request's sealed bytes into its own event. If that copy opens first, the original is refused as a replay and its sender never hears back. Safety holds: a POST then ends outcome-unknown.
Answer budgets: caps on answer targets and chunks.
Limits: a bound on publish-phase memory, and a cap on inbound frame size.
A CPU measurement under flood, on the real host.
Plan 2's preconditions: a replay window, a memory measurement, and key-rotation overlap.
npx tsc --noEmit exits 0, and npm run build exits 0.
npm test passes 1534 of 1535. This branch adds 81 tests.
The one failure is tests/native-publication.test.ts "Linux publication…". It comes from main's native work, fails only on Windows, and also fails alone there, because Git Bash's GNU tar reads C: as a remote host. It passes on CI's Linux.
Live check: the real src/server.ts, with only the pool service stubbed and the carrier on nos.lol and nostr.mom. createSealedFetch ran from Node against live Mutinynet.
arkd /v1/info and the Esplora tip height came back.
The pool status came back through a relative URL.
A 96 KiB page was reassembled from chunks.
A sealed POST ran once.
A foreign host got 403, and the tx stream got 400.
POST /ohttp is off.
No secrets appeared in the output.
Median sealed GET: 436 ms.
Re-run at the merged head on 2026-11-10, through relay.snort.social and offchain.pub: everything passes.
Median sealed GET: 247 ms.
The 96 KiB chunked page: 287 ms.
Relay health that day:
nos.lol and nostr.mom accepted connections and reads but timed out every publish, with no OK.
nostr-pub.wellorder.net could not be reached.
See Known follow-ups.
Review:
Each task was reviewed, with fix rounds where needed.
The whole branch was then reviewed on Opus, and its fix wave was re-reviewed.
The controller confirmed the memory, reconnect and stored-event traps against the library source and strfry's defaults.
After deploy, key unset: the start log says "Oblivious HTTP gateway off." and nothing else changes.
Known follow-ups
Plan 2c: carrier hardening, before Plan 3.
Relay health, in Plan 2c. On 2026-11-10, three of the six default relays were unusable: two silently dropped publishes and one was down.
A POST counts a publish timeout as "possibly delivered".
So if both relays a POST picks silently drop it, the POST waits 40 s and ends outcome-unknown. With that day's list, that is about 1 POST in 15.
Plan 2c tracks which relays acknowledge and maintains the default list.
SHIELDED_NOSTR_RELAYS and the client's relays option override the list today.
Plan 3:
keep page sizes under 241,644 B;
show outcome-unknown as pending, then reconcile;
treat a caller's abort of a published POST as unknown too.
Liveness: a relay that keeps its socket open but stops forwarding is not detected yet.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Added sealed-request support over Nostr relays, including automatic retries, response handling, and safeguards for oversized requests.
Added configurable Nostr relays and an optional HTTP OHTTP endpoint.
Key generation now displays the public Nostr key for gateway setup.
Documentation
Expanded deployment guidance with relay configuration, gateway behavior, and setup details.
Kind 21470 carries a sealed OHTTP request to a gateway: one p tag, a fresh
signing key per event and created_at rounded down to 30 s. Kind 21471 carries
the answer as up to 32 chunks of 32 KiB, tagged e/p to the request, or as one
status event (429 or 503 plus a retry delay) that wins over any chunks.
Readers verify the signature before trusting pubkey or tags, count only the
gateway's own events for the request, and return nothing until the answer is
complete and consistent. A different chunk count, or two different bodies for
one chunk, is inconsistent.
The spec gives a status event two tags, ["status","429"|"503"] and
["retry-after","<seconds>"]. The first version merged them into
["status","503","2"], so a status event built to the spec was ignored by
readAnswer: a client would wait out its 40 s deadline, and a POST that
provably never ran would end outcome-unknown. statusEvent now emits the two
tags and readAnswer reads the delay from retry-after.
Found in review:
- verifyEvent throws on null, primitives and events frozen before their
first check, so one bad entry aborted readAnswer for the whole batch. It is
wrapped, and an entry that throws counts as unverified.
- Chunk index and count, status and retry-after must be plain digits.
Number() let '', '0x0' and a blank retry-after (as 0) through.
- An empty payload is no request and no chunk, and answerEvents throws
RangeError on 0 bytes instead of returning no events.
- NOSTR_RELAYS is frozen, so a caller's sort() cannot reorder the default.
Each reader guard that no test pinned (answer kind, chunk cap, index at the
count, status off the 429/503 list, negative, blank or missing retry-after,
non-digit chunk numbers) now has a gateway-signed case that fails when the
guard is removed.
…a Nostr key
The Nostr carrier hands the gateway sealed bytes that never arrive as an
HTTP request. Admission (shed with 503, then the rate window with 429)
and the open, replay, forward and seal sequence now live in one function
each, which POST /ohttp and a new open() both call, so the two carriers
share the rate window, the in-flight cap and the replay register. open()
decides busy before it opens anything, so a busy status never answers a
request that already ran.
open() caps the inner answer per call, since a Nostr answer is at most
1 MiB, and holds its slot until it settles. It has no upload and no late
reader, so the upstream deadline bounds it without the route's timers.
http:false leaves out POST /ohttp and keeps GET /ohttp-keys.
The gateway's Nostr key is HKDF-SHA256 of the OHTTP X25519 secret, with
info shielded-nostr-carrier-v1, so there is still one secret to keep and
rotating the OHTTP key rotates the Nostr key. ohttp:keygen prints the
public key as a third line.
The backstop is 3 x timeoutMs by design, so a test timeout of 50 ms left
a 150 ms backstop. Under load, it cut the socket while the gateway was
still sealing the upstream's 504. Sealing runs on the libuv threadpool,
so it spans event-loop turns; in a starved process the upstream deadline
and the backstop fall due in the same timers phase, and the backstop
destroys the response before the answer is written. The client saw
"other side closed" after the 264 bytes of the GET /ohttp-keys reply.
With 20 CPU burners and 40 concurrent copies for 3 rounds, "limits answer
instead of hanging" failed 37/120 at baseline and 0/120 with the backstop
at 20x, so the backstop is the cause. In an interleaved run, timeoutMs
500 took that test from 53/120 to 3/120, and "a failed or timed-out
upstream frees its slot" from 61/120 to 3/120. The 3 that remain took
4-15 s a run, against about 0.4 s normally.
Production's backstop is 90 s, so only test parameters change. Tests that
mean the upload deadline or the backstop to fire keep their short values.
The stalled-upload test ran its gateway at a 50 ms timeout, so the sealed
200 it opens after each cut upload had a 150 ms backstop, and under load
that backstop cut it the same way: "other side closed". At 500 ms the
upload deadline still cuts the stalled upload, well inside the test's 5 s
wait, and the follow-up open gets a 1.5 s backstop.
With 20 CPU burners and 40 concurrent copies for 3 rounds, before and
after interleaved, it failed 19/120 at 50 ms and 0/120 at 500 ms.
The backstop test keeps its 200 ms timeout and its window. Under the same
load it failed 3/120, all on the window's lower bound (454-486 ms against
500). The test starts its clock when it sees the upstream call, after
decapsulation and a 10 ms poll, while the backstop counts from admission.
That is the accepted floor, so it stays as it is.
The test took the window's start when its 10 ms poll saw the upstream
call, after decapsulation, while the backstop counts from admission.
Under load that lag ate the 0.5 x timeoutMs of room below the 3x cut, and
the cut read as early. Admission can only follow the send, so the lower
bound now runs from the send and holds however the event loop is
scheduled. The upper bound stays on the poll.
With 20 CPU burners and 40 concurrent copies for 3 rounds, before and
after interleaved, the window failed 2/120 before (239 and 484 ms, both
low) and 0/120 after. The 3/120 the test still fails are its follow-up
sealed open, cut by its own 600 ms backstop on a fresh socket.
open() passed maxAnswer straight to the reader. A NaN turned the cap off,
since size > NaN is never true. A cap above 4 MiB let a body past the
OHTTP server's 5 MiB message limit, so sealing threw after the upstream
had run. Before this change, NaN or 8 MiB over a body of 4 MiB + 1 sealed
an inner 200 with the whole body, and 8 MiB over a 6 MiB body rejected
with MESSAGE_TOO_LARGE.
maxAnswer < 4 MiB ? maxAnswer : 4 MiB clamps it, and a NaN fails closed
to 4 MiB, where Math.min would pass it through. Each case now seals an
inner 502. Unexpected throws still reject, because one can come after
the request ran.
A wallet can now reach the pool without an HTTP relay: it publishes its
sealed request as a kind 21470 event, and the gateway answers with kind 21471
events (or a status event when it is busy) on the relays that carried it.
The listener starts the first time the pool is open and closes before it.
Copies of a request are dropped before open(). open() sheds at its cap before
it looks for a replay, so a copy of a request that is still running would be
told busy, and a client reads a status as "never ran" and may resend a POST.
For the same reason an open() that throws publishes nothing: the throw can
follow the upstream call.
The pool's own reconnect is left off. It reopens at since=lastEmitted+1, so
one future-dated event, or a request in the same 30 s bucket as the last one,
leaves a relay deaf, and it never retries a relay that failed its first
connection. The listener reopens a closed subscription itself after 30 s.
POST /api/rollup/ohttp is now mounted only with SHIELDED_OHTTP_HTTP=1; the key
config route stays. A gateway behind an HTTP relay needs that variable set.
tests/rollup-launch-guard.test.ts pinned the old inline mount in the source
text; it now looks for the mount of the kept gateway reference.
… busy
open() checked admission before it looked for a replay. At the in-flight cap,
or over the rate, a copy of a request that was running or had finished got a
busy outcome, and the carrier publishes a busy outcome as a status event. A
client reads a status as "never ran" and may send a POST again, so a POST that
ran could run twice.
The carrier drops copies by event id before open(), but that memory holds
10 000 ids: a flood of signed events evicts a running request's id, and a copy
republished after that reached open() at the cap.
open() now looks the request's HPKE enc up in the replay register first. The
register holds only requests that opened, so no sender can plant a value in it,
and no decapsulation is needed to read the enc. Fresh bytes are still shed and
rate-counted as before.
…ailure modes
The bus stands in for nostr-tools' pool in the carrier tests and will in the
wallet client's, so it has to fail the way the pool fails.
subscribeMany now reports its close once, after every relay of the call has
closed, with one reason per relay. The bus reported each relay as a close of
its own, which a client that frees its state on onclose would have run early.
Two relay modes for the client's tests. unreachable: a publish fulfils with
"connection failure: ...", as the pool does for a relay it cannot connect to
(it does not reject), the relay takes nothing, and a subscribeMany slot closes
at once. timesOut: the relay takes the event and delivers it, but the publish
rejects with "publish timed out", as when the OK is lost. The client cannot
tell that from an event that never arrived, which is what a POST must survive.
tests/nostr-bus.test.ts pins the contract.
The listener subscribed with SimplePool.subscribeMany. That keeps a Set of
every event id its subscription sees (_knownIds in subscribeMap), fills it
before the message is parsed or verified, and never prunes it. The id is cut
from the raw relay message with slice(), which V8 keeps as a sliced string, so
each remembered id pins the whole message. Measured on a loopback relay with
Node's WebSocket and 1000 requests of 39.5 KiB: +39.4 MiB, 41 341 bytes per
event, invalid events included. At 20 small requests a second that is on the
order of 100 MiB an hour in the process that holds the pool.
The listener now asks the pool for each relay (ensureRelay) and subscribes on
the relay itself, so nostr-tools never creates that set. The carrier's own
10 000-id window is the only id store: +0.8 MiB, 869 bytes per event for the
same flood, and bounded. Answers go out with relay.publish on each relay that
delivered the request, and an unreachable relay is a rejected lookup, counted
as unpublished.
What the real pool does, checked on a loopback relay. ensureRelay rejects with
the string "connection failed" and keeps no stale entry. After a clean or an
abrupt close the subscription's onclose fires, the pool forgets the relay, and
ensureRelay opens a new connected one, so the 30 s resubscribe works as before.
A relay object is dead once its connection is: publish rejects, and subscribe
raises an unhandled rejection. So the listener asks for the relay right before
it uses it and keeps none. No connect timeout is passed: the pool's own leaves
the half-open socket behind (still open after destroy()), and undici bounds a
connect.
CarrierPool stays for the wallet client, whose short-lived subscriptions free
their sets when they close.
tests/nostr-carrier-pool.test.ts runs the real pool over an in-memory socket:
the retention check (38 675 bytes per event before, under 8 KiB asserted), the
briefed filter, the answer, and the resubscribe after a failed first open, a
clean close and an abrupt drop. The bus gains the pool's dedupe across relays
for subscribeMany, and ensureRelay with relay objects that die with their
connection. The runbook no longer claims the listener's memory grows.
The default pool was SimplePool, whose nostr-tools/pool bundle carries its own
copy of verifyEvent. That copy caches its verdict on the event under a symbol
of its own (pool.js:41), and nostr-tools/pure caches under another (pure.js:20),
so the pool checked every event and then readRequest checked it again: two
Schnorr verifications per request.
The default is now an AbstractSimplePool given pure's verifyEvent, so the
pool's check and readRequest's share one cached verdict. A request through the
default pool leaves exactly one verdict on the event object, which the new test
asserts (it was two); a frozen delivered event also verifies without a second
check. The pool is otherwise what SimplePool was: no reconnect, no ping, the
same 3 s connection wait, and the global WebSocket.
The library prints around the listener's counts-only logging. A relay NOTICE
goes to console.debug as "NOTICE from <relay>: <text>" (pool.js:203), and when
a handler throws while a message is processed it warns with the relay and the
event (pool.js:650-657), which is the event content the listener promises never
to log.
Relays the listener obtains now get a silent onnotice. note() can no longer
throw (a failing clock or console would have made the handler that called it
throw, or run() reject unhandled), and both handlers handed to the library are
wrapped, so none of them throws into it.
One print remains and cannot be silenced from here: when a relay sends a
message the library cannot parse, or an event its own filter match cannot read
(a kind 21470 event with no tags), the library warns with the relay and the
error, and with the event in the second case. The runbook says so and tells
the operator to drop a relay that does it.
Every shed or rate-limited request makes the listener sign a status event and
publish it to each relay that delivered the request. A sender pays one
signature per request, the gateway pays a signature and several publishes, so a
flood of cheap requests made the pool's process sign and publish for as long as
the flood lasted, and the relays could rate-limit its real answers.
Status events are now capped at 5 a second with a fixed window, like admit().
Past the cap the listener publishes nothing and counts status-capped. The
wallet's attempt then times out: a GET is sent again, and a POST ends
outcome-unknown, which is the safe outcome. Answers are never capped.
The runbook describes the cap, the new count, and what a wallet sees under a
flood.
wss://a.example and wss://a.example/ name one relay, and the pool keeps one
connection for it, but the listener took them as two and opened two
subscriptions on that connection. Every request then arrived twice.
nostrRelaysFromEnv now normalises each entry with nostr-tools' normalizeURL
(lowercase host, default port and fragment dropped, slashes collapsed, trailing
slash settled) and deduplicates after normalising, so each relay is subscribed
once however its URL is spelled. The entries it returns are the normalised
form, which is also the form the pool keys its connections by.
…s and loss
Wording the review found wrong or missing.
A request's 32 KiB is the sealed bytes. As an event, in base64 with its fields,
it is about 44 kB, so a relay needs an event size limit above that.
A POST that only reaches relays the gateway does not listen on is lost, not
just one attempt: a relay accepted it, so the wallet never sends it again, and
it ends outcome-unknown. A GET only loses an attempt.
Anyone who reads a relay can copy a request's sealed bytes into an event of
their own, and the gateway runs them again once its register of opened requests
has forgotten them, which a restart does.
lost also counts a relay that could not be reached, and unpublished an answer
for a relay that could not be reached.
Limits now name liveness (no pings; Node's WebSocket client turns on TCP
keepalive, 60 s initial delay in the undici Node embeds, so a dead peer is
dropped by the operating system eventually, but a relay that keeps the socket
open and stops forwarding is not detected yet) and the status cap.
…cription
A relay can answer a REQ with CLOSED (rate-limited, auth-required) and keep the
connection. The real pool then closes the subscription and calls onclose, and
the listener's 30 s resubscribe should run exactly as it does for a dropped
connection. This runs that case on the real pool over the in-memory socket: no
new REQ before 30 s, one at 30 s, and a request on it is opened.
createSealedFetch is the wallet's half of the Nostr carrier: it seals a
request with Oblivious HTTP, publishes it as one event on public relays and
opens the gateway's answer, so a relay sees neither the target nor the body.
It runs in the browser and in Node and imports the server's pool type only.
Each attempt seals afresh, picks untried relays first and subscribes for the
answer before it publishes. A GET moves to another attempt at its deadline and
keeps the earlier subscriptions open, so a late answer still counts. A POST
goes out again only when it provably never ran: a status event came back, or
no relay took the event. nostr-tools fulfils "connection failure" for a relay
it never reached and rejects an OK false with NIP-01's reason; a publish that
timed out or lost its connection may still have been delivered, so a POST in
that state ends outcome-unknown at its deadline instead of running twice.
A status event's retry-after is cut to the attempt deadline, since a large
value would otherwise stall the client. The default pool leaves nostr-tools'
reconnect off (it resubscribes at since=lastEmitted+1, the trap the listener
hit) and takes pure's verifyEvent, so readAnswer reuses the pool's verdict.
nostr-tools fulfils a publish with the relay's own OK text, data[3], and a
relay may leave it out. The verdict called startsWith on that value inside a
.then nothing awaited, so ["OK",id,true] with no message threw an unhandled
rejection. On Node that ends the process: any public relay could stop a Node
host with one frame.
The value is now read through String(), so a missing or non-string message
counts as the OK the relay sent.
A POST went out again whenever the relays said it never ran: a status event,
an OK false, or a "connection failure". Each retry was sealed afresh, so a
relay that refused but delivered anyway, one whose OK text read "connection
failure", or a shed copy held back past the listener's 10 000-event memory
could each run the POST beside its retry.
Non-GET requests are now sealed once, and every attempt wraps those bytes in
a fresh event and keeps the same OHTTP context. The gateway refuses any copy
whose enc has already opened and never records a shed one, so at most one
copy runs and a shed POST's retry still opens. Earlier subscriptions stay
open, so the answer of whichever copy ran reaches the client. GETs keep a
fresh sealing per attempt, so a lost answer can be fetched again.
The bus gains two lying relays: refusesButDelivers (an OK false, delivered)
and claimsUnreachable (fulfils "connection failure", delivered).
A body over 5 MiB failed inside ohttp-ts with OHTTPError(MessageTooLarge)
instead of the too-large code a caller handles, and a body of any size over
32 KiB was sealed only to be thrown away. Sealing only adds bytes, so a body
over one event's 32 KiB can never fit: it is now refused before sealing. The
check on the sealed bytes stays for a body just under the limit, whose
framing and padding push it over.
close() destroyed the pool but nothing else: a fetch made afterwards ran
as usual, and a GET in flight kept retrying, so nostr-tools opened fresh
sockets to publish it for up to (attempts - 1) x timeoutMs after close().
close() now marks the client closed. A new fetch rejects at once with
SealedFetchError('unavailable'), and a fetch in flight rejects the same way
instead of publishing its next attempt. An attempt already out is left to
its deadline, so a POST that went out still ends outcome-unknown.
…argin
The POST retry test now checks that content-type survives the sealing and
the retry, next to the body it already checked.
The late-answer test resolved about 100 ms before its last attempt's
deadline would have ended the fetch. Through A the request and its answer
each wait 150 ms, so the answer lands near 300 ms, later when the first
sealing runs cold. A fifth attempt moves the last deadline past 500 ms.
The close test passed even without the check at the top of the fetch: the
check before each attempt publishes still stopped it, but only after the
body was read and sealed. It now asserts the fetch is already rejected one
microtask after the call, which only the early check achieves.
refusesButDelivers and claimsUnreachable name what they do, so the note on
take() goes back to the two behaviours a reader cannot see from an option
name, which keeps this round's comments within a tenth of its lines.
The OK value a publish fulfils with is whatever JSON the relay put in its
frame, straight from JSON.parse. String() was not enough: {"toString":1}
makes String() throw inside the unawaited .then, which on Node is an
unhandled rejection that ends the process, and ["connection failure: x"]
stringified into nostr-tools' own unreachable text, so a relay that took
the event read as one that never got it.
Only a string can be nostr-tools' "connection failure" text, so any other
value now counts as the OK the relay sent.
…ailable
No relay reply proves an event was never sent: an OK true can carry text
that mimics nostr-tools' own "connection failure:", an OK false can lie,
and a relay can hold a shed copy past the listener's 10 000-id memory. So
a POST that ran out of attempts, or met close() between attempts, after
any of its bytes reached publish could have run, and calling that
unavailable invites a user to pay again with other notes.
A fetch now records when an attempt hands its bytes to publish. Once it
has, a non-GET that gets no answer ends outcome-unknown, whether its
attempts ran out or close() came between them. unavailable is left for
GETs and for a non-GET that never published, such as one close() refused
at the door. Retries are unchanged: still sealed once, still on a status
or when no relay took the event.
SealedFetchError now says in one line what each code promises, and the
seal-once note says the POST runs at most once while the gateway
remembers its enc, which is all its in-memory register can promise. The
note on the publish verdict goes back to its earlier wording.
…able
Ruling 11 keeps unavailable for a non-GET that never handed its bytes to
publish, and that covers close() landing while the first attempt seals,
not only the check at the door. Nothing pinned it, so a rule that called
every closed non-GET outcome-unknown would have passed. The close test
now closes a POST while it seals and expects unavailable and no publish.
strfry refuses an ephemeral event more than 60 s old. Rounding down
took up to 30 s off the start, so a client whose clock ran only 30 s
slow could have its request dropped. Rounding to the nearest 30 s
tolerates a clock about 45 s slow, and puts an event at most 15 s in
the future, far inside strfry's 900 s limit.
A request is signed by a one-time key that carries no authority, and
relays already check signatures (NIP-01). Verifying Schnorr on every
request costs about 2 ms before the gateway can shed it, where the id
hash costs a fraction of that (0.005 ms for a small event, 0.26 ms for
a full 44 kB one, measured). readRequest now checks only that the id
is the event's hash. readAnswer keeps the full check: answers carry
the gateway's authority, and a client reads few of them.
This revisits Ruling 2 for requests only.
statusRoom counted its one-second window on the wall clock. A clock
stepped back by NTP would hold the window shut, so no shed request
would be told busy until the clock caught up, and every shed POST
would read as outcome-unknown. The window now runs on performance.now,
as the gateway's admit() does; created_at keeps the wall clock.
The cap test now moves only the monotonic clock to open the next
window, so it fails on a wall-clock window.
The comment said open() sheds at its cap before it looks for a replay.
That stopped being true when open() began checking its replay register
first. The dedupe stays for two other reasons: a copy adds its relay to
the answer's targets, and open() records an enc only after decapsulating
it, so a copy arriving in that window would be admitted, or told busy,
a second time.
With an empty relay list, pick or attempts under 1, or a timeout of 0
or less, createSealedFetch built a fetch that could not deliver
anything. A POST through one set 'sent' before the empty publish and
ended outcome-unknown: with relays [], it failed outcome-unknown after
75 ms with no event published. Construction now throws a RangeError
for any of these, NaN included. No caller outside the tests builds a
sealed fetch yet.
Also renames the outcome-unknown helper from `unknown` to
`outcomeUnknown`, which reads as what it returns.
"Turn it on" still waited on the gateway accepting only configured
relays. With the Nostr carrier anyone reaches the gateway through
public relays, so that precondition is replaced by an abuse budget:
inbound work per forwarded event on the pool's main thread, signing
and bandwidth per answer, publishing outside the in-flight cap, and
Node's WebSocket accepting very large frames. Plan 2c and a CPU
measurement under flood on the real host come before production.
Also: one instance per key (two would both answer every request), the
pool's egress address that relay operators see, and what V8's parse
error quotes of a frame (up to 10 characters on either side of the
fault, measured on Node 24.16). And the facts this wave changed: the
8-event answer cap of 241,644 bytes, created_at rounded to the nearest
30 s, and the limit:0 subscription that keeps a restart from rerunning
stored requests.
After the cut at three deadlines, the test proved the slot came back
with a sealed request over HTTP, which carries its own 600 ms
backstop (3 x 200 ms). Under extreme load that follow-up was itself
cut, 3 times in 120 runs. The slot is shared, so checking it through
router.open(), which has no backstop, proves the same thing without
the timing.
deepEqual on two 100 KiB arrays prints a byte-by-byte diff when they
differ, and a failure there took about 105 s to report. A length and
a sha256 say the same thing: one corrupted byte now fails in 157 ms.
On a dead connection the bus's relay.subscribe threw synchronously.
nostr-tools 2.24.1 does not: Subscription.fire() calls the async send()
without awaiting it, so subscribe returns normally, no onclose ever
follows, and the SendingOnClosedConnection becomes an unhandled
rejection (probed against the real AbstractSimplePool). The bus now
returns normally and records the would-be rejection in `unhandled`,
which tests can assert.
No live bug follows from the old difference: the carrier subscribes in
the same microtask chain as ensureRelay, so a relay cannot die between
the two.
…both ends
Every client test so far ran on the in-memory bus, which models the
library's publish results rather than producing them. This one runs the
real gateway and carrier and createSealedFetch, each on its default
AbstractSimplePool, over the in-memory socket, which now routes events
between the sockets on one URL and can refuse a request event (OK
false) or take it in silence (no OK, no delivery).
Three fetches: a sealed GET round trip; a POST whose first relay
answers OK false, so it is published again elsewhere and answered;
and a POST whose OK never comes. The library rejects that publish
"publish timed out" after 4.4 s, which a POST counts as accepted, so
it is not published again and ends outcome-unknown. The socket also
records any request event published before its answer subscription.
Mutations each fail it: publishing before subscribing (all four
requests unheard, though every answer still arrived), taking every
rejection as accepted (the refused POST ends outcome-unknown), and
taking every rejection as refused (the timed-out POST is resent and
answered).
…e 8-event answer
limit:0 also applies when the listener resubscribes after losing a relay, so requests that reached it during the gap are never heard: they never run, a GET goes out again elsewhere, and a POST only that relay took ends outcome-unknown. The 8-event answer cap assumes Node's default 16 KiB response-header limit; a raised --max-http-header-size lets an answer take more events, never more than 32.
This change adds Nostr as a transport for sealed OHTTP requests and answers. It defines event formats, derives a Nostr key from the OHTTP key, adds server-side relay handling and an optional HTTP route, and provides a client fetch API with relay selection, retries, and outcome handling.
Changes
Sealed OHTTP over Nostr
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Nostr event format and gateway keys packages/protocol/src/nostr-carrier.ts, src/rollup/ohttp-keys.ts, tools/ohttp-keygen.ts, tests/nostr-carrier-wire.test.ts, tests/ohttp-keys.test.ts
The protocol adds request, answer, and status events, with size limits, validation, and answer chunk assembly. The gateway derives a Nostr key from its OHTTP key, and key generation prints the Nostr public key. Tests cover event handling and key derivation.
The gateway adds a direct open method and makes the HTTP route configurable. Both paths share admission and replay handling. Forwarded responses are limited by the applicable answer-size cap.
Relay carrier and server startup src/rollup/nostr-carrier.ts, src/server.ts, tests/nostr-carrier.test.ts, tests/nostr-carrier-pool.test.ts, tests/fixtures/nostr-bus.ts, tests/nostr-bus.test.ts, docs/DOKPLOY.md, dokploy.env.example
The server starts the Nostr carrier when the service is ready and an OHTTP key is configured. The carrier validates and deduplicates requests, publishes answers or status events, and retries lost subscriptions. Tests and deployment guidance cover relay configuration, lifecycle, and behavior.
Client sealed fetch and retry behavior src/shielded/sealed-fetch.ts, tests/sealed-fetch.test.ts, tests/nostr-carrier-pool.test.ts
The client seals requests, selects relays, and reads matching answers. It handles retry statuses, aborts, size limits, and uncertain non-GET outcomes. Tests cover client behavior and an end-to-end real-pool flow.
arkade-os/shielded#127: Adds the OHTTP gateway and key handling that this change extends with a Nostr transport and direct gateway opening.
Merge Risk: Minimal · up to be09d
This adds an optional Nostr relay transport for sealed requests that stays off unless an OHTTP key is configured. No concrete merge-blocking defect was identified in the supplied context. The documented production gates remain follow-ups before relying on it in production.
Pre-merge checks: 4 · 1
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Title check
The title clearly summarizes the main change: carrying sealed OHTTP requests over Nostr relays, with the feature off by default.
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Docstring coverage is 18.18% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff with cyclomatic complexity of at least 2. Documentation-only edits and deletions within surviving functions are included; unchanged diff context and fully deleted functions are excluded. Analyzed 11 functions across 16 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)
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Cross-repo check: no consumers of OhttpOpen, createSealedFetch, NOSTR_REQUEST_KIND, or nostrSecret/nostrPublic found in ts-sdk, go-sdk, rust-sdk, or dotnet-sdk. The new types are server-internal and the protocol package addition is additive.
Production gate items (confirming, not new)
These are all documented in the PR; listing them here as explicit confirmation they were checked:
src/rollup/ohttp-gateway.ts:277 — in-memory replay register only. seen is a plain Set. A restart, or any 100 001st request, forgets the enc and allows the same sealed bytes to run again. Bounded only by the in-flight window in practice. The PR documents this correctly and gates production on an inner Date check (RFC 9458 §6.5.1). Confirmed prerequisite before any persistent wallet targets this endpoint.
src/rollup/nostr-carrier.ts:196–198 + src/rollup/ohttp-gateway.ts:282–287 — enc-copy race (front-running).
An actor who can read relay traffic can copy the sealed bytes of a valid request event into a new event under a different pubkey. Both events pass readRequest and handled (different IDs), both enter open(), both pass the pre-check while neither enc is yet in seen, and the first to complete decapsulateRequest and reach seen.add wins. The loser gets {kind:'refused'} and publishes nothing. For a GET the client retries. For a POST the original sender receives no reply and the fetch ends outcome-unknown even though the POST ran (or may have run under the winning event). Safety holds—at most one upstream execution—but liveness for the original sender breaks. Plan 2c (addressing answers by sha256(enc)) is the fix. Confirmed prerequisite before POST-carrying wallets are wired up.
src/rollup/nostr-carrier.ts:184–188 — answer publishing outside the in-flight cap.
The run() function publishes answers after inFlight-- (via finally in open()). Many simultaneous answers can be in flight without bound. Combined with the note that Node's WebSocket client accepts very large frames without a size cap, a flood can drive unbounded outbound signing and I/O. Documented as a Plan 2c precondition (CPU measurement under flood, answer budget, inbound frame cap). Confirmed.
Code-level observations
src/rollup/ohttp-gateway.ts:282–283 — open() pre-checks the replay register before admit(); the HTTP route does not.
The HTTP route calls admit() first, then reaches unseal() which does the seen.has check. So a repeated sealed request on the HTTP route consumes a rate slot before being refused; the same bytes via open() do not. This asymmetry is intentional per the comment, but it means the two paths have slightly different rate-slot semantics for replays. Worth verifying that the test at tests/ohttp-gateway.test.ts:1301 ("open() refuses…sharing the register with the HTTP route") covers the cross-path case — it does, confirming the register is shared. The rate-slot difference is benign but worth a comment where open() pre-checks.
src/rollup/ohttp-gateway.ts:286 — maxAnswer capped at MAX_RESPONSE with < not <=.
maxAnswer<MAX_RESPONSE?maxAnswer:MAX_RESPONSE
NaN < MAX_RESPONSE is false, so NaN falls through to MAX_RESPONSE (4 MiB). The test at line 1329 verifies this. A negative maxAnswer would be < MAX_RESPONSE (true) and used as-is, triggering an immediate 502 on the first byte. This can't be reached in production (the carrier passes a fixed positive value), but the guard could be clearer: (Number.isFinite(maxAnswer)&&maxAnswer>0&&maxAnswer<MAX_RESPONSE)?maxAnswer:MAX_RESPONSE.
src/rollup/nostr-carrier.ts:174 — fixed-window status cap.
A burst spanning a window boundary can emit up to 2 × STATUSES_PER_SECOND (10) status events in roughly 1 second. For a client polling rate of one request per second, this is harmless. Documented in the PR.
packages/protocol/src/nostr-carrier.ts:118–121 — readAnswer returns on the first status event in mine.
If the gateway emits two status events for the same request (e.g., a 503 and a 429), the first one in event-arrival order wins. This is unreachable today since run() calls statusEvent exactly once per request, but callers of the wire-protocol library should know the first-wins rule.
src/rollup/ohttp-keys.ts:345 — HKDF with undefined salt.
undefined salt causes @noble/hashes/hkdf to use the HKDF default (a zero-byte string of hash length). This is standard for HKDF when the IKM already has sufficient entropy (the 32-byte X25519 key does). The info string 'shielded-nostr-carrier-v1' domain-separates the derivation. No issue.
src/shielded/sealed-fetch.ts:512 — pool.destroy() on close() is pool-wide.
If a caller passes a shared pool instance, close() destroys it for all users of that pool. The default creates a fresh pool per createSealedFetch, which is safe. The API documentation should note this. The attempts / pick parameter validation guards against misuse but nothing prevents pool sharing.
src/shielded/sealed-fetch.ts:497 — sent=true before pool.publish resolves.
sent=true is set synchronously in the Promise constructor before the publish completes. This is intentional: "we initiated publishing" is what sent means, and noAnswer() uses it to decide between outcome-unknown and unavailable. An in-progress attempt that gets overtaken by done=true (from a prior attempt's answer) can still set sent=true and kick off a publish after the fetch has resolved. For a POST, the gateway's replay register ensures at most one execution. The outcome-unknown path is unreachable once the fetch has already returned a Response. Correct per design; worth a comment in the code for the next reader.
Test coverage
81 new tests. Edge cases well covered: memory retention, reconnect, stored-event replay, dedup by ID vs enc, status cap, close() ordering, abort, relay misbehaviour variants. The memory test at tests/nostr-carrier-pool.test.ts:712 with two GC calls and a per-event budget of 8 KiB on 40 KB events is a solid regression guard for the subscribeMany leak. The nostr-carrier-pool.test.ts:754 test that verifies a bad signature still reaches open() while a bad ID does not is exactly the right check for the deliberate idMatches-only validation.
One gap: no test exercises the scenario where gateway and open() are called concurrently with identical sealed bytes from two different event IDs (the enc-copy race). A test here would let Plan 2c's fix be regression-tested immediately on merge.
Summary
The gate (SHIELDED_OHTTP_KEY unset) correctly keeps this off. The refactoring of admit() and unseal() into shared helpers is clean. The identified production prerequisites match what the docs list. The main things to track before Plan 3:
enc-copy race → Plan 2c answer addressing.
Replay window → inner Date check.
Answer publishing and inbound frame size → Plan 2c budgets and cap.
The rate-slot asymmetry between open() and the HTTP route for replays (benign, but document or equalise).
open() clamped maxAnswer only from above, so a negative or zero value
became the cap as given: forward() then turned every non-empty upstream
answer into a sealed 502 (a 4 MiB body came back as an empty 502 under
maxAnswer -1). Only a finite value between 0 and 4 MiB now narrows the
cap; anything else, NaN and Infinity included, falls back to 4 MiB.
open() checks its replay register before admit(), so a copy over the
Nostr carrier costs nothing from the shared rate. The HTTP route cannot:
it admits in its first middleware, before express.raw has read the
body that holds the enc, so a replay there spends a rate slot (and an
in-flight slot while it is read) before it is refused. One line says
so, so nobody "fixes" the order on one side to match the other.
`sent` turns true when publishing begins, not when a publish was needed:
an attempt that an earlier attempt's answer overtook can still publish,
because done is set only once the fetch's race has settled. For a POST
that copy carries the same sealing, so the gateway's replay register
still keeps the POST at most once.
close() calls pool.destroy(), which also tears down a pool the caller
passed in and may share. The function's doc now says so, in the
comment that already described the default pool.
readAnswer returns the first well-formed status event it finds, in the
order the events came in, and a status beats any chunks. No test pins
the first-status rule because nothing can reach it today: the gateway
publishes at most one status per request. The doc line records the
rule for whoever changes that, such as Plan 2c addressing answers by enc.
Anyone reading a relay can copy a request's sealed bytes into an event
of their own. Two such events, with different ids and identical bytes,
delivered at once through two relays: the gateway calls the upstream
once, publishes one answer set for whichever event opened first, and
nothing for the other, whose open() is refused as a replay.
Both copies pass open()'s replay pre-check together, so it is the check
after decapsulation that holds: with that check removed, the test fails
3 of 3 runs. The test pins today's safety. The loser's lack of an answer
is the front-running gap Plan 2c closes by addressing answers by enc;
when it does, the last assertion is the one to change.
The follow-up added four comment lines in nineteen. Three explained things the code or the commit history already carries: readAnswer's first status wins (unreachable today, as the gateway sends one status per request), the HTTP route admitting before it reads the body so a replay there spends a rate slot, and close() destroying the pool, a caller's own included. Those reasons now live in their commit messages and the PR thread. The one kept explains what the code cannot: sent means publishing began, so an attempt an earlier answer overtook may still publish, and the gateway's replay register keeps a POST at most once.
Thanks, arkana. Follow-ups are in cddbddc..be09daf.
maxAnswer guard: a non-positive or non-finite value now falls back to the 4 MiB cap (cddbddc). A new test failed before the fix: a -1 gave an empty 502 for a 4 MiB body.
The enc-copy race: pinned as today's behaviour (d6922b8). Two events carrying the same sealed bytes, delivered at once through two relays, give one upstream call and one answer set; the other event gets nothing.
The test fails if the check after decapsulation is removed, because both copies pass open()'s pre-check together.
Plan 2c addresses answers by sha256(enc). When that lands, this test's last assertion is the one to flip.
sent=true: one comment line saying it means publishing began. An attempt that an earlier answer overtook may still publish, and the gateway's replay register keeps a POST at most once.
The other three notes stay out of the code. The repo caps comments at 10% of a change, so the reasoning for them is in their commit messages and here:
Replays cost the two routes differently.open() refuses a replay before admit(). The HTTP route admits before reading the body, so a replay there spends a rate slot first. This is benign, and the shared register is tested across both routes.
The first status wins in readAnswer. That is unreachable today, because the gateway sends one status per request.
close() destroys the pool, including one a caller passed in. The default makes a fresh pool for each createSealedFetch.
Unchanged and already documented: the fixed-window status cap, which can burst to 2× across a window boundary, and HKDF with no salt, which is fine for a 32-byte X25519 key.
The production gates you confirmed are listed in the description and the runbook: the replay window, front-running, and the publish and frame budgets (Plan 2c).
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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
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Failed pre-merge checks:
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Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage
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Files selected for processing: 18
docs/DOKPLOY.md
dokploy.env.example
packages/protocol/src/nostr-carrier.ts
src/rollup/nostr-carrier.ts
src/rollup/ohttp-gateway.ts
src/rollup/ohttp-keys.ts
src/server.ts
src/shielded/sealed-fetch.ts
tests/fixtures/nostr-bus.ts
tests/nostr-bus.test.ts
tests/nostr-carrier-pool.test.ts
tests/nostr-carrier-wire.test.ts
tests/nostr-carrier.test.ts
tests/ohttp-gateway.test.ts
tests/ohttp-keys.test.ts
tests/rollup-launch-guard.test.ts
tests/sealed-fetch.test.ts
tools/ohttp-keygen.ts
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Follow-up pass · be09daf — 18 net lines across 4 files (1 logic fix, 3 comment/doc additions, 2 new tests). 2 prior code-level findings fixed; 1 test gap closed; 7 findings remain open by design or as documented production prerequisites. No new issues.
Prior-finding closure
#
Finding
Status
1
In-memory replay register (ohttp-gateway.ts:277)
Still open — production gate, no code change, correctly documented
Correct for all edge cases: NaN → MAX_RESPONSE; -1, 0 → MAX_RESPONSE; 8<<20 → MAX_RESPONSE; a valid sub-cap value passes through. The new test (tests/ohttp-gateway.test.ts, "open() takes a negative or zero maxAnswer as the 4 MiB cap") exercises -1 and 0 on a 4 MiB body (passes) and a 4 MiB + 1 body (502). Covers the reported bug. ✓
d6922b82 — enc-copy race test (tests/nostr-carrier.test.ts)
The test publishes the same sealed bytes under two different event IDs on two different relays simultaneously, then asserts: g.calls.length === 1 (one upstream call), outcomes sort to ['refused','sealed'] (one of each), the winning event ID gets a sealed answer, the losing ID gets none. Correctly pins the current asymmetric behavior and the comment names Plan 2c as the fix point. The final assertion (readAnswer(g.answers(), loser, ...) === undefined) is exactly the one that flips when enc-based answer addressing lands. ✓
b0007268 / de390fa0 / babeedcd — comment additions only
Three commits add inline comments (sent semantics in sealed-fetch.ts, first-status-wins in nostr-carrier.ts protocol doc, replay-before-admit asymmetry). No behavioral changes; comments are accurate.
Remaining production prerequisites (unchanged)
Replay window — inner Date check (RFC 9458 §6.5.1) is wallet-side work.
enc-copy race — Plan 2c enc-based answer addressing.
Publish and frame budgets — CPU measurement under flood, answer budget, inbound frame cap (Plan 2c).
The gate (SHIELDED_OHTTP_KEY unset, SHIELDED_OHTTP_HTTP off by default) correctly keeps all Nostr-carrier paths inactive until explicitly enabled. Code in this increment is clean.
On CodeRabbit's Docstring Coverage pre-merge check: I'm not adding docstrings across these modules. This repo caps comments at 10% of a change's added lines, and its style keeps only comments that explain something the code can't. The reasoning behind each choice is in the commit messages and in this PR. #127 merged with the same check unmet. CodeRabbit's review of all 18 files (6fcb37d..be09daf) raised no other findings.
#144)
Harden the Nostr carrier from #142:
- Answers and statuses are addressed by x, the SHA-256 of the sealed request; statuses also name the request event they answer.
- The listener groups copies of a request into one run, with a 16 MiB answer cache re-published to relays that deliver a copy late.
- An outbound budget of 64 publications a second, checked by open() after its replay check. The debt ceiling is documented.
- ws relay sockets: a 1 MiB frame cap, a 10 s handshake timeout, a 4 MiB event backlog, and one message per task.
- A canary on every relay every 30 s; checks before hashing; at most 12 relays.
- The client hedges publishes no relay acknowledged, benches failing relays for 5 minutes, and validates relay URLs.
- New default relays, probed on 2026-11-10.
Off by default: nothing changes until SHIELDED_OHTTP_KEY is set.
…te=1 (#147)
Run the browser wallet through the Nostr carrier from #142 and #144, behind ?private=1 on builds that pin the gateway:
- The gateway refuses a sealed request whose inner x-date is more than 90 s off, or dated before the carrier started listening, and forwards x-digest.
- The sealed fetch dates each request and times attempts by method: GET 9 s, POST 40 s, with a 45 s publish bound.
- src/shielded/private-transport.ts: the policy-gated sealed fetch; global overrides (fetch, EventSource, XHR, WebRTC, and WebSocket to the pinned relays only); isolated providers; the mutation journal. Same-origin assets, proving files and the native release list go direct.
- The wallet pages pool batches 12 at a time and does not repeat a sealed 502 or unavailable. It strips /sign to the depositor's input, refuses batch swaps, and caps a shield at 20 coins with fee-aware fallbacks.
- The browser journal releases an unknown-outcome spend on a pool 404 between 15 and 45 minutes after it was sent, on the wallet's tick.
- Boot: ?private=1 sets a localStorage flag, and no link turns it off. An unpinned build that sees the flag stays closed, and native builds never install the browser transport. Private mode hides the Lightning, Bitcoin and renewal actions it cannot carry.
- Off unless SHIELDED_OHTTP_CONFIG and SHIELDED_NOSTR_GATEWAY are set at build time; docs/DOKPLOY.md covers turning it on.
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Summary
Wallets can now reach the pool's Oblivious HTTP gateway (#127) through public Nostr relays. No relay operator has to agree to forward traffic for us.
SHIELDED_OHTTP_KEYis set.Wire format (
packages/protocol/src/nostr-carrier.ts)created_atis rounded to the nearest 30 s.Gateway (
src/rollup/ohttp-gateway.ts,ohttp-keys.ts,nostr-carrier.ts,src/server.ts)open()is shared by the HTTP route and the listener: admission, the replay register, forwarding and sealing.shielded-nostr-carrier-v1), so there is still one secret. The keygen prints its public key asnostr:.ensureRelay, withlimit:0and asincebound.open(), and answers on every relay that delivered the request.POST /api/rollup/ohttpis off unlessSHIELDED_OHTTP_HTTP=1.GET /api/rollup/ohttp-keysstays.nos.lol,relay.snort.social,offchain.pub,nostr.mom,nostr.oxtr.devandnostr-pub.wellorder.net.SHIELDED_NOSTR_RELAYS.Client (
src/shielded/sealed-fetch.ts, runs in the browser and in Node)createSealedFetchis a drop-in fetch. It keeps only thecontent-typeandacceptheaders, and never falls back to a direct request.outcome-unknown, neverunavailable.nostr-tools 2.24.1 traps found and avoided
subscribeManykeeps every event id it sees, as a V8 sliced string that pins the whole relay message (about 40 KB per 40 KB event).enableReconnectresubscribes withsince=lastEmitted+1, so one future-dated event deafens the listener. It is off, and the listener resubscribes itself.enablePingclosed healthy connections at about 49 s. It is off.publishfulfils withconnection failure: …for an unreachable relay, and passes on the relay's raw OK value, which may be absent or an object. The client classifies results defensively.limit:0andsince, a restarted gateway would run answered requests again.Before turning it on in production
docs/DOKPLOY.mdlists these:sha256(enc). Today a reader can copy a request's sealed bytes into its own event. If that copy opens first, the original is refused as a replay and its sender never hears back. Safety holds: a POST then endsoutcome-unknown.Test plan
npx tsc --noEmitexits 0, andnpm run buildexits 0.npm testpasses 1534 of 1535. This branch adds 81 tests.tests/native-publication.test.ts"Linux publication…". It comes from main's native work, fails only on Windows, and also fails alone there, because Git Bash's GNU tar readsC:as a remote host. It passes on CI's Linux.src/server.ts, with only the pool service stubbed and the carrier onnos.lolandnostr.mom.createSealedFetchran from Node against live Mutinynet./v1/infoand the Esplora tip height came back.POST /ohttpis off.Known follow-ups
outcome-unknown. With that day's list, that is about 1 POST in 15.SHIELDED_NOSTR_RELAYSand the client'srelaysoption override the list today.outcome-unknownas pending, then reconcile;Summary by CodeRabbit