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Security: USAREUR-AF/first-bite

SECURITY.md

Security policy

first-bite, part of goat, reads raw network traffic and runs with capture privileges. Security reports are prioritised over feature work.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue or pull request to report a vulnerability.

Report a vulnerability privately

You can also open the reporting form from this repository's Security tab by selecting Report a vulnerability.

Reports are private and accessible to repository administrators, organization owners, security managers, the reporter, and collaborators explicitly added to the advisory. Being listed in CODEOWNERS does not itself grant access. Reports remain private until an authorized maintainer publishes the advisory. See GitHub's advisory permissions for details.

Include: a description of the issue and its impact; reproduction steps or a proof of concept (a synthetic capture file or a payload in hex is ideal); the affected versions or commits; whether you have shared it elsewhere.

What to expect

Step Target
Acknowledgement 3 working days
Triage and severity 7 working days
Fix or mitigation for a confirmed high or critical issue 30 days, with a coordinated disclosure date agreed with you
Public advisory when the fix is released, crediting you unless you prefer otherwise

Scope

In scope: the code in this repository and the release artifacts built from it, including the decoder's handling of malformed packets and malformed dictionaries. Out of scope: upstream projects (libpcap, ZeroMQ, Zenoh, the cloud SDKs) — report those to their maintainers, and tell us too if first-bite's use of them is affected; any deployment you do not own.

A dictionary describes a message set. Do not attach a dictionary or a capture that you are not permitted to share.

Supported versions

Pre-1.0, the latest tagged release is supported. Fixes land on main and are released by tag.

How this repository is watched

Control Where Runs What it catches
leak gate .github/workflows/leak-gate.yml running tools/check-public-tree.sh every pull request, forks included, and every push to main private keys, cloud access key ids and tokens; capture files outside examples/; SSH public keys, age recipients, MAC addresses, private and CGNAT IPv4 addresses, e-mail addresses outside example.org, assistant session links and attribution trailers; names on the maintainers' list (a repository secret). It prints the file, line and class, never the match
contributor trust .github/workflows/contributor-trust.yml, running the check kept in goatcore every pull request a change from an author outside the maintainers that no owner has reviewed for security: from an unknown author, or touching a path in .github/contributor-trust/sensitive-paths.txt. An owner records the review with the label security-reviewed; a new push removes it
leak check self-test tools/check-public-tree.test.sh, scripts job of ci.yml every pull request and push to main a leak check that has stopped catching one of its classes
pre-commit hook tools/git-hooks/pre-commit, installed with make hooks each commit, on the contributor's machine the same shapes as the leak gate, in the staged files, before they enter history
pin check tools/check-pins.py, scripts job of ci.yml every pull request and push to main a GitHub Action not pinned to a full commit SHA; a container image in a workflow, Dockerfile, compose file or the Makefile without a digest; a pinned image no Dependabot entry updates
advisory audit .github/workflows/rust-audit.yml (cargo audit) pull requests that change a Cargo.lock or a Cargo.toml; weekly a dependency with a RustSec vulnerability advisory, in the workspace or in the fuzz targets. Each ignored advisory is listed with its reason in .cargo/audit.toml, and for OSV-based scanners in osv-scanner.toml
dependency policy .github/workflows/cargo-deny.yml (deny.toml) pull requests that change Cargo.lock, a Cargo.toml or deny.toml a licence outside the allowed list; a wildcard version; a crate from outside crates.io
CodeQL .github/workflows/codeql.yml every pull request and push to main; weekly code-scanning findings in the Rust and Python sources and in the workflows
Scorecard .github/workflows/scorecard.yml pushes to main; weekly; when a branch rule changes regressions in supply-chain posture: unpinned dependencies, workflow token permissions, branch protection. docs/security/scorecard.md goes through it check by check
Dependabot .github/dependabot.yml weekly newer versions of crates, GitHub Actions, the Dockerfile base images and the mock images, as pull requests
tests of hostile input bite/tests/robustness.rs, bite/tests/hostile_dictionary.rs, test job of ci.yml pull requests that change code a decoder or dictionary loader that panics on a malformed payload or dictionary, or exceeds a limit of bite/src/limits.rs
fuzzing fuzz/ (three libFuzzer targets), .github/workflows/cflite_pr.yml and cflite_batch.yml (ClusterFuzzLite) pull requests that change code, for 5 minutes; every night and pushes to main that change code, for 30 minutes a panic, an arithmetic overflow, a memory error, a hang or runaway memory use in the decoder, the dictionary loader or the frame pipeline, on an input no test thought of
release provenance publish job of .github/workflows/release.yml every release a release asset that was not built by this repository's release workflow: each asset's digest is in a signed SLSA provenance statement, published as a GitHub artifact attestation and as the release asset first-bite-<version>.intoto.jsonl. Check one with gh attestation verify <file> --repo USAREUR-AF/first-bite
image provenance image-publish job of .github/workflows/release.yml every release a container image that was not built by this repository's release workflow: the digest of ghcr.io/usareur-af/first-bite:<version> is the subject of a signed SLSA provenance statement and of a signed SBOM attestation, stored in the registry beside the image and as GitHub artifact attestations. Check with gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/usareur-af/first-bite:<version> --repo USAREUR-AF/first-bite
script lint shellcheck and yamllint in the scripts job of ci.yml every pull request and push to main mistakes in shell scripts and workflow files

CodeQL and Scorecard run only while the repository is public; both workflows skip on a private repository, and a release or image made then has no provenance. docs/security/threat-model.md states what the design protects and what it does not; docs/security/transport.md is the guide to transport security: the security block, the levels it enforces at startup, and mind security show, which prints what each outbound path uses. The local ZeroMQ record socket is plaintext and unauthenticated; under a security block it is refused off loopback. docs/security/ holds the assessments.

There aren't any published security advisories